What exactly has the ITRE Committee adopted on 28 February 2012 as regards withholding allowances as from third phase
- Category: Implementation
The question that is today particularly vital for the CO2 trading community: do elaborations of the ITRE Committee included in the Compromise Amendment No 18 have any direct impact on the current trading conditions with respect to CO2 allowances?
Will the Australia’s carbon price floor influence on the prices for international units?
- Category: Australia cap-and-trade
Depending on the method adopted for carbon pricing mechanism, the investors and covered entities will potentially have difficult mathematic formulas to analyse.
Flawed application of the auction reserve price in the EU ETS
- Category: Auctions of CO2 allowances
“Each auction will be conducted with an auction reserve price.” “No allowances will be sold at bids lower than the auction reserve price.” Are these provisions present in the EU ETS legislation? No, obviously not. These are the citations from the California cap-and-trade scheme documents. The analogous stipulations we can find in the newest Australia’s emissions scheme.
Instead of this in the EU ETS we have Article 7(6) of the Auctioning Regulation.
Draft Tender Specifications for the Joint procurement of a common auction platform (dated 17 February 2012) seem to make desperate efforts in order this provision be more transparent. Draft Tender Specifications give, moreover, some clues which may be valuable for market actors preparing for auctions participation.
The requirements for financial intermediaries bidding in the auctions of emission allowances of the third trading period
- Category: Auctions of CO2 allowances
In the article ‘The eligibility to apply for admission to bid in the auction pursuant to the Auctioning Regulation’ there were set out the basic principles for delineating the personal scope of entities granted the right to bid directly in the auctions (see Article 18 of the Auctioning Regulation). It follows that operators of installations and aircraft operators may only bid in the auctions on their own account, and, with some exceptions particularly for business groupings of operators (bidding on their own account and acting as an agent on behalf of their members), the only categories of potential intermediaries in the auctions are investment firms authorised under Directive 2004/39/EC and credit institutions authorised under Directive 2006/48/EC.
Besides, it is noteworthy to remind that another significant exception to the said rule represent commodity firms covered by exemption provided for in Article 2(1)(i) of Directive 2004/39/EC bidding on behalf of clients of their main business but the specific position of these firms in the auctioning context is referred to in greater detail in the above cited post.
Considering the procedure for making common auction platform operational are advanced (the UK opt-out auction platform as well) it is time to look into practical requirements flowing from the Auctioning Regulation as regards the financial institutions participation in the auctions, especially when the financials intermediate for account of their clients.
Australian carbon auctions design – improvement of the EUETS auctioning model or regression?
- Category: Auctions of CO2 allowances
It follows from the Australian Government document that Australian emission allowances auction design can have quite original features. As a consequence bidding strategies elaborated under assumption of the EUETS rules may occur not entirely effective on the Australian carbon primary market.
Legal nature of emission allowances as a property rights
- Category: Emissions trading
There are arguments that EUAs should be classified as "property" and "intangible property" at common law.
Page 49 of 69