ICE Futures Europe Circular 11/038 of 10 March 2011 – safeguarding the position of the Exchange but what about the traders?
- Category: Emissions trading
Does the ICE Futures Europe Circular 11/038 of 10 March 2011 mean that the trader that was delivered by the Clearing House and the Exchange “prohibited” emission allowances has no legal remedies against the seller? Such a rule would be difficult to accept from the position of legal interests of the buyer as a party to the agreement. It seems that in the said document there are also other points that should be carefully considered.
Delivery delay mechanism in EU ETS registries – something like the RGGI design?
- Category: Emissions trading
Under Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Model Rules the Regulatory Agency of the RGGI (or its agent) records a CO2 allowance transfer by moving each CO2 allowance from the transferor account to the transferee account within 5 business days of receiving a CO2 allowance transfer.
Is this a right remedy for the EUETS recent weaknesses?
Enforcement of the surrender obligation and companies affiliations – something missing?
- Category: Emissions trading
It should be considered that the responsibility for the timely surrendering of emission allowances be accounted for at a level of a group of affiliated companies.
Californian v European model for emission allowances auctions – which of them is better suited to the market
- Category: Auctions of CO2 allowances
Auctions are the pivotal element of the primary market for emissions allowances in the Californian cap-and-trade as well as EUETS. The Auctioning Regulation present in the EUETS (No 1031/2010 of 12 November 2010) seems generally more detailed than the Regulation Order proposed by Air Resources Board. Contrary to the ARB proposal it specifies for instance such details as consequences of late or non-payment etc.
There are many similarities in the auction design and also some differences of technical nature. But several economical and legal assumptions and measures are original in the Californian model for auctions.
Knowledge sharing under NER300 Decision - how to retain the knowledge for yourself (II)
- Category: CCS
It should be stressed that the category of Foreground and, consequently, the requirement of knowledge sharing - comprises the property of the Project Sponsor or every relevant consortium member, supplier or sub-contractor who developed it. All these complex issues need therefore to be carefully considered and precisely specified in all contracts governing the project applying for NER 300 funds.
Knowledge sharing under NER300 Decision - how to retain the knowledge for yourself (I)
- Category: CCS
Licensing requirements in the “Specifications of the Legally Binding Instrument” seem to be a little bit ambiguous. The said provisions should be interpreted separately as regards each of the categories “Relevant Knowledge”, “Foreground” and “Background”. For information defined as “Background” the issue seems to be clear – it is not subject to the knowledge sharing requirements. But the other two categories deserve to be given due consideration.
The Cost Containment Mechanisms in the California Cap-and-Trade Program – why absent in the EUETS?
- Category: Emissions trading
In the European cap-and-trade the cap is established on the volume of allowances and, unfortunately, not on the price. But as the experience shows there are interesting concepts, how to mitigate not only the impact of climate change, but also the price risks inherent in the scheme. Direct quarterly sales of allowances from the Allowance Price Containment Reserve and the fixed Auction Reserve Price cause (providing that the Reserve won’t be prematurely exhausted) that in the California cap-and-trade the regulatory-fixed price range from 10$ to 75$ per metric ton of CO2 can be specified in the perspective 2012 – 2020 (with appropriate modifications in each year of the period).
District heating delivered to private households pursuant to the Benchmark Decision – different tariffs needed
- Category: Implementation
In both of the said models there are decreasing curves of allocation but the main difference (different factors excepting) is that the base for allocation for heat production for private households could be real historical emissions – without using natural gas benchmark.
Benchmarks Decision of the Commission – rules on closures specified
- Category: Implementation
It should be noted that, pursuant to the Decision, an impact on the installation’s allocation of EUAs have, generally, three categories of events:
1) the change to an installation’s capacity (Articles 20 and 21 of the Decision),
2) the change to an installation’s operation (Article 22 of the Decision), and
3) the change to an installation’s activity level (Article 23 of the Decision).
The publicness of the data held in the CO2 allowances registries – pivotal principles decided by the recent judgment
- Category: Emissions trading
Are the individual characteristics of transactions in emission allowances, which are entered into registries, publicly available? If yes, under what conditions and to what extent? What is the relation between the Registry Regulation and the Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on public access to environmental information and repealing Council Directive 90/313/EEC (OJ 2003 L 41, p. 26)? Does the Registry Regulation provide for the specific rules in this field or the said Directive is nevertheless binding as regards requests for making publicly available trading data (dates, volumes, parties to the transactions, prices etc.)? All these, vital for young emission market, questions are decided in the recent judgment. But we go a little further and make some classifications as regards the subject-matter.
Legal complications with the recovery of the stolen allowances
- Category: Emissions trading
Imagine hypothetically that the stolen allowances were entered into circulation and were subject to the transactions for the sale (or other disposal) of allowances between the parties in different Member States.
Objective responsibility of insiders extends to the primary market in emission allowances and to the commodities physical market in electricity and gas
- Category: Judgments of the European Court of Justice
There are reasonable grounds to believe that the legal regime for the responsibility of insiders, emphasising the objective elements of the factual circumstances, elaborated on the basis of the MAD Directive, will also be applied on the grounds of the Auctioning Regulation and the future REMIT Regulation.