In both of the said models there are decreasing curves of allocation but the main difference (different factors excepting) is that the base for allocation for heat production for private households could be real historical emissions – without using natural gas benchmark.



It should be noted that, pursuant to the Decision, an impact on the installation’s allocation of EUAs have, generally, three categories of events:

1) the change to an installation’s capacity (Articles 20 and 21 of the Decision),

2) the change to an installation’s operation (Article 22 of the Decision), and

3) the change to an installation’s activity level (Article 23 of the Decision).


As a consequence of the Article 10c(2) of the Directive 2003/87/EC, the funds from auctioning meant for “greening” the economy and gathered at a State level, in these Member States that qualify for and make use of the derogation provided for in the Article 10c (for instance, highly dependent on coal) will be much smaller, than in countries, that already are “green”.

This is a paradox as regards the framework created by the said Directive.


The free allocations of EUAs to district heating and high efficiency cogeneration in the third trading period will be decreased by way of four different legal measures. The Directive 2009/29/EC thus treats CHP more favorable than electricity generators (which, with exception provided for in Article 10c, receive no free allocation at all) but place them in the much less advantageous position than sectors exposed to “carbon leakage”.


Taking into account that CHP and district heating and cooling in some Member States are obliged to apply prices included in regulated tariffs, it seems natural that national regulators, when approving the said tariffs, should take into consideration the costs of the acquisition of CO2 credits. The detailed extent of the inclusion of these costs into the tariff is yet contentious and, as regards the particulars of the evaluation of that cost, there are many details to be explored.


The regulatory uncertainty in that regard may negatively influence on any investment plans.


To put it briefly - in that regard the diversity isn’t desirable.


It is a common practice that, in the course of restructuring, the groups of undertakings are closing non-effective installations and transfer the production to the most effective ones. Such an objective lies often at the origin of mergers and acquisitions in the capital market.


Taking into account the legal scheme of the EU ETS there are arguments that the abovementioned practice should be reflected in rules relating to installations that entirely or partially ceased to operate or significantly reduced their capacity, on the one hand, and the new entrant reserve on the other. But the aforementioned mutual legal dependencies unfortunately are not included in the text of the Directive 2003/87/EC.

The problem appeared already in the case law. The issue is now – but only as regards the third trading period - in the hands of the European Commission which is obliged by the Directive to adopt by 31 December 2010 legal measures provided for in the Articles 10a(7) and 10a(20) of the Directive.