According to the revealed contributions to the consultation on the enhanced transparency regime for the wholesale energy markets the German utilities RWE and EnBW share the view that generation and consumption units need to be treated the same.

RWE and EnBW differ, however, in whether the aggregate or unit-by-unit data should be published.

As it seems, it is the EdF that reaches one of the core problems, which is the need that the transparency regime should not require divulging the commercial and hedging strategies of market players, which remain strictly confidential.

 

 

The long-awaited Guidance Document n°7 issued in September specifies which technical modifications constitute ‘physical change’ in the EU ETS installation and which do not. The additional or reduced allocation of emission allowances valid in the third trading period obviously is at stake.

 

 

The European Commission on 26 September 2011 launched a public consultation on strengthening EU measures to reduce emissions of fluorinated gases. Among manifold policy options considered analytical study attached to the consultation’s documents expressed little preference for the general inclusion of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorcarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) in the EU ETS.

 


The text of the legislative proposal for EMIR, originally proposed of the European Commission on 15 September 2010 (COM(2010) 484 final), being analysed in the post ‘The implications of the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) for commodity firms trading on the emissions market, has been substantially changed by the European Parliament on 5 July 2011 (ordinary legislative procedure: first reading).

 

The modifications made are far-reaching and in a particular way influence on the position of the commodity firms trading on the emissions market. Beneath a cursory review of the main amendments to the draft EMIR by the European Parliament on 5 July 2011 with focus on those particularly relevant for non-financial counterparties.

 

 

The European Parliament in the 1st reading extended the obligation to publish inside information on parent undertakings and related undertakings.

 

 

How to reconcile the two values mentioned in the title above? Does the decision to participate in EMAS mean the waiver of the company’s right to protect confidentiality of the environmental commercial or industrial information? Nothing of the kind. The EMAS Regulation contains a clause on this occasion, proposing indexing information against a baseline year.

 


As the KASHUE (Polish National Administration for EUETS) announced, submissions relating to the draft of the NAP for the period 2008 - 2012 may be made only by the date 23 March 2010. According to the KASHUE, methodology for allocation of allowances applied in the draft, is analogous to that of 1 July 2008.


The European Commission upheld thus its decision relating to Polish CO2 allocations – despite the court defeat. But taking into consideration the findings of Court of First Instance in he judgment of 23 September 2009 in Case T‑183/07 there is still theoretically possible the opposite move – the increase in amount of allocations.

Since all depends on actual emissions figures – and these must be up-to-date.

Contrary to other sectors of economy, where allocations of CO2 allowances amount from 80% to 30 % (2020), allocations for sectors deemed to be exposed to significant risk of carbon leakage will be 100 %. But in many concepts of energy-climate package words have different – not popular - meaning.


Also in the said case 100% does not mean full coverage of needs of installations.

 

We remind, that it is now running the period for submission to the European Commission of opinions and remarks in respect of the future shape of the auctioning system.


Their opinions expressed inter alia
the Danish Energy Association and the the Association of the Austrian Electricity Companies.


According to both opinions, a single-round sealed-bid auction is the most appropriate auction format for auctioning EU allowances. In the views of the stakeholders, the most appropriate pricing rule for the auctioning of EU allowances is uniform-pricing.


Rationale for this is the view that such a formula gives a clear price signal for the value of an EUA, thereby increasing predictability. It also ensures that every successful participant pays the same price, meaning that the auction price will be fair and minimises the risk of distorting the secondary market.


Both organisations also consider, that the rule for solving ties in the future Regulation should be pro-rata re-scaling of bids.


The opinions of both stakeholders are also consistent in that there should no reserve price apply.